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Introduction 
  Over the last fifty years, administrative politics has undergone a radical 
transformation.  Unlike the preceding era of state-building, which was identified by the 
establishment and consolidation of a centralized administrative apparatus, the post-war 
period has been marked by extensive delegation.  A variety of agencies, commissions, 
organizations, courts and departments carry out essential governance tasks in issue areas 
ranging from telecommunications to the environment.  And this wave of delegation has 
occurred at both the domestic and the international levels. 
  There has been considerable attention paid in political science literature initially 
in American and comparative and increasingly in International Relations sub-fields to 
this empirical trend (Huber and Shipan 2003; Pollack 2003).  These efforts, focusing on 
their respective level of analysis, have asked three fundamental questions.  First, why do 
elected principals delegate authority to agents to implement and enforce law?  Second, 
how does delegation affect the ability of principals to control the actions of agents?  
Third, how effective are delegated agents in improving the quality of regulation.  For the 
purposes of this essay, I am explicitly interested in the second of these questions.  In 
addressing the control debate, two strands of literature have emerged.  One emphasizes 
the role that formal institutions play in shaping the principal-agent relationship 
(McCubbins, Noll et al. 1987; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994).  The second, examines how 
agents may deploy political authority to entrepreneurially shape the political process 
(Fliegstein and Drita 1996; Carpenter 2001).  
  In this essay, I rely on the insights of these research programs to analyze an 
important and often overlooked pattern in delegation – the dual delegation of authority to   2 
agents above and below the nation-state.  As national economies integrate at the same 
time that technological complexity progresses, decision-makers confront at home and 
abroad the difficulty of devising specific policy responses to the challenges of 
international interdependence.  At both the domestic and international levels, agents have 
been created or redeployed to confront these challenges.   
  This process of dual delegation, I contend, has important implications for 
questions concerning bureaucratic control and autonomy distinct from those isolated by 
national or international investigations.  While the existing literature in International 
Relations examines the relationship between national governments and international 
organizations and comparative politics research focuses on domestic elected officials and 
internal non-majoritarian institutions, this paper examines the effect of both processes on 
international affairs.  The dynamic environment created by the delegation of authority to 
sub-national and international institutions shapes the ability of national principals to 
monitor and enforce agent behavior at the same time that it shifts the resources available 
to agents to act in an entrepreneurial fashion. Critical, then, in this move is the rejection 
of the notion of the unitary state as an actor in international politics and the acceptance 
that sub-national units may play an important role in the evolving international system 
(Slaughter 2004).   
  The following essay is a preliminary exploration of the effect that dual delegation 
has on the role of agents in international politics.  It will proceed in four parts.  The next 
section briefly details the delegation of authority in the national and international arenas.  
This will be followed by a summary of the two dominant strands of literature concerned 
with bureaucratic control.  Section three will then offer a series of propositions that   3 
attempt to promote discussion over the effects of dual delegation and sketch out a 
preliminary research agenda.  The final section concludes with some unresolved 
questions and underscores the theoretical foundations of the project.    
 
Delegating At Home and Abroad 
  Scholars concerned with non-majoritarian institutions found the 20
th century rich 
with empirical and theoretical questions.  At both the domestic and the international 
levels, elected officials have delegated rule-making and rule-enforcing authority to a host 
of appointed organizations (Abbott and Snidal 1988; Majone 1996).  Legislators 
overwhelmed by the complexity of specific policy issues delegated tasks to agents, who 
could provide expert knowledge and fill information gaps.  Additionally, elected officials 
used delegation to commit their governments over the long-term to a particular policy 
strategy.  By buffering an issue from electoral politics, delegation reduced the likelihood 
that regulation would shift with the whim of each change in government (Majone 2001; 
Thatcher and Sweet 2002).  In addition to the broad theoretical justification for delegation 
a series of empirical challenges arose at the national and international levels such as 
domestic and international market liberalization that facilitated the expansion of 
delegated authority. 
Delegation at Home 
  While delegation has been an important component of the modern nation-state 
since its inception, the 20
th century has seen a radical expansion of the governance tasks 
handled by delegated agencies.  Following Thatcher, the primary motivations for 
delegation over the last one hundred years fall in two groupings: market-  4 
making/enforcing and social protection (Thatcher 2002).  One set of regulatory agencies, 
at the national level, has been constructed to set and enforce the terms of market 
competition.  Popularized by new deal institutions including the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), governments have 
established agents that supervise, monitor, and enforce the rules and regulations of a 
sector.  In the 1980s, European nations following the US example have established a host 
of agencies to oversee liberalization and privatization efforts.  In sectors ranging from 
telecommunications to utilities, independent regulatory agencies have been created 
(Thatcher 1999; Heritier 2002).  The result of deregulation strategies, then, has often been 
the reregulation of economic sectors supervised by delegated agents (Vogel 1996). 
  At the same time that governments have relied on delegation to handle problems 
associated with market-making, a number of agencies were created across the 
industrialized world to deal with issues concerning social protection.  Consumer safety, 
worker health, environmental protection, civil rights, and information privacy are just 
some of the issues that have migrated into the responsibility of delegated agents.  Most 
authors attribute this rise to the rights revolution which transpired across the industrial 
world in the 1960s and 1970s.  Social movements pushed for increased transparency and 
the protection of individual rights (Epp 1998).  Legislators responded by establishing 
independent authorities that could deal with the specific policy problems associated with 
an issue area (Kagan 2001). 
  As a result of this push to regulate markets and social protection, the industrial 
world has been over-run by new institutions.  These institutions, in turn, have 
considerable responsibility for the implementation of regulatory tasks.       5 
Delegation Abroad 
  At the same time that governments have created authority to manage domestic 
policy problems, similar efforts have transpired at the international level.  Nations have 
collectively agreed to cede sovereignty to international organizations. As nations realize 
their mutual dependence, the justification for formal cooperation and international 
delegation increases.  This has occurred in issue areas ranging from the allocation of 
satellite slots to the regulation of international shipping with organizations emerging such 
as the International Telecommunications Union or the International Maritime 
Organization (Keohane 1984; Martin and Simmons 1998). 
  The case of market integration proves particularly illustrative.  Both international 
trade liberalization as well as regional integration efforts have encouraged delegation.  As 
international exchange increases and barriers to trade fall, there is great potential for 
friction.  As explicit trade restrictions such as tariffs and quotas are removed, non-tariff 
and technical barriers to trade are exposed.  The need arises for third party dispute 
settlement mechanisms and monitoring devices to prevent shirking.  As a result, national 
government have delegated authority to institutions in organizations such as the World 
Trade Organization, the North American Free Trade Agreement, or the European Union 
which are supposed to provide the credible commitments and information necessary to 
assure continued cooperation (Pollack 2003; Barton, Goldstein et al. Forthcoming).  
 
  While existing research has primarily investigated these two empirical trends in 
isolation, that is the delegation of authority by national governments to sub-national units 
or the delegation of authority by national governments to international organizations, this   6 
paper examines the multiple levels simultaneously.  The next section reviews the analytic 
tools available to dissect the political implications of dual delegation above and below the 
nation-state.    
 
Learning from Bureaucratic Control and Autonomy Literature 
  In order to gain analytic purchase on the effect of dual delegation for international 
affairs, I turn to two literatures popular with scholars of national and international 
politics.  I label these research efforts bureaucratic control and bureaucratic autonomy.  
Both start from a similar belief that as agents are created they develop independent 
preferences from their principals.  Whether as competency maximizers (Pollack 2003) 
that want to expand their authority or as part of a bureaucratic culture (Barnett and 
Finnemore 2004), agents seek to assert these preferences in the policy-making process. 
Agents will do this even when their preferences may conflict with the preferences of their 
principals.  The bureaucratic control literature focuses on the formal rules that principal’s 
employ to control agents. The bureaucratic autonomy literature, by contrast, examines the 
resources available to agents to achieve their preferences.  I explore each literature before 
turning to their implication for the phenomenon of dual delegation in the international 
arena. 
Bureaucratic Control 
  First popularized in the American sub-field, the bureaucratic control literature has 
more recently turned to questions of delegation in the European and International 
contexts (McCubbins, Noll et al. 1987; Pollack 1997; Pollack 2003).  This strain of 
literature recognizes the fundamental control dilemma that elected officials face when   7 
they delegate authority.  As mentioned earlier, principals turn to delegation to solve 
information problems or to establish credible commitments.  As principals cede authority 
to agents, however, concerns arise that agents will shirk their responsibilities and follow 
their own preferences.  Rogue agencies run loose on the policy scene, unaccountable to 
their creators (Weingast and Moran 1983; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).  
  The control literature, therefore, focuses on the institutions (primarily formal) that 
monitor and enforce agent compliance.  In order to minimize the deviation of agent 
behavior, principals construct institutions that inform them of agent activity.   Principals 
can directly audit agent activity through committee reviews.  This however is quite costly 
so principals often mobilize interest groups to fulfill the surveillance functions.  Sunshine 
laws that require agents to reveal their actions expose agent behavior to the scrutiny of 
interest groups who may then report shirking to elected principals (McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994).  Similarly, sanctions may be used to 
control agency behavior.  The primary methods of sanction come from direct veto, 
scrutiny, budget controls, and leadership appointments.  If principals are altered to 
behavior deviations, they may subject an agent to intense committee supervision and 
shaming.  If behavior is not affected, principals can constrict budget allocations or change 
agent leadership (Weingast and Moran 1983).   
Principal control relies on their ability to know when agents are shirking and then 
punish such action.  This ability, in turn, rests on a set of formal institutional rules.  The 
literature suggests that principal control varies as these institutional constraints vary 
(Gilardi 2002; Pollack 2003; Shipan 2004).   8 
The ability of agents to undertake discretionary action is then a function of the 
formal institutional environment.  While this literature is well suited to identify the 
institutional conditions under which discretionary action is possible, it does not have a 
clear means of explaining variation in discretion given a set of conditions.  Put another 
way, given the same formal institutional control mechanisms why are some agents better 
able to assert their autonomy than others. 
Bureaucratic Autonomy 
  Coming at the question from a different angle, research on bureaucratic autonomy 
examines the resources available to agents to assert their preferences.  Attempting to 
address the limits of the control literature, work on autonomy explains variation in 
discretionary action. In this literature, however, bureaucrats are not only in a cat and 
mouse implementation game with their principals, but they may also use their authority to 
change the rules by which they play.  In both discretionary action and changing the rules 
of the game, bureaucrats are political actors capable of building coalitions which support 
their policy agenda (Carpenter 2001; Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  Agents have the 
ability to alter principal preferences through persuasion and coercion.  They may reframe 
a debate or raise the costs associated with inaction.  Agents act as political entrepreneurs 
who disturb and at times command the policy process (Fliegstein 2001).  This does not 
mean that agents always replace principals in formal decision-making institutions.  
Rather, agents have a set of resources, which they may deploy to affect policy outcomes. 
  The two most important of these resources are reputation and network affiliations.  
Through years of effective service, agents may obtain the reputation of providing both 
technically appropriate and normatively good solutions to pressing policy problems.    9 
Their technical knowledge of an issue area provides them with an expert authority.  
Interest groups, the public, and even elected officials come to rely on the opinions of 
agents and respect the information advantage they have in a policy field (Haas 1992; 
Brint 1994).  Similarly, the concrete responsibilities of an agent often enhance reputation 
through moral authority.  Organizations responsible for assisting refugees or protecting 
the environment may benefit from the way in which the public perceives their efforts 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  Agents can use their reputation to persuade principals 
about appropriate policy action.  They have the power to frame issues and offer solutions.  
At the same time, they can mobilize public opinion for their agenda, condemning policy 
options that they find inappropriate.  
  In addition to their reputation, agents have relationships with constituencies, 
interest groups, and other political players which they may mobilize on behalf of their 
preferences.  Many agents directly serve a specific interest group.  These interest groups 
can form a powerful lobby that the agent may incite into action.  The literature on social 
protection has identified a number of cases where policy action creates a client group that 
in turn defends program administrators from attach by elected principals (Pierson 1993).  
Agents also often develop important relationships with elected officials as well as other 
agents.  These relationships prove vital as agents attempt to build coalitions in support of 
their agenda (Evans 1994).  The greater number of networks in which they are embedded 
the greater their number of potential allies.  Therefore, agents that have diverse network 
affiliations are well positioned to rally support behind their position and in turn raise the 
costs associated with inaction (Carpenter 2001).   10 
 
The literatures on bureaucratic control and autonomy offer valuable insight into 
the ability of delegated agents to assert their preferences and shape political outcomes.  
Research on the formal institutions that define the relationship between principals and 
agents has identified a series of constraints agents face as they engage the policy process.  
Principals may circumscribe the functional tasks assigned to agents, set up monitoring 
mechanisms to assure compliance, and construct sanctions to punish independent 
behavior. Agents are better positioned to assert their preferences as they face fewer 
formal monitoring institutions to audit their behavior and enjoy greater institutional 
independence in the form, for example, of budgetary independence or long-term tenure.  
Research on autonomy, by contrast, has focused on the resources available to agents to 
work within and overcome such constraints.  Bureaucrats deploy technical authority and 
political allies to exert discretionary power and expand their maneuverability even to the 
point of reconstructing the foundations of their mandate.  Agents become political 
entrepreneurs capable of reframing principal preferences.  The two literatures then offer a 
set of complementary tools with which to begin to analyze the process of dual delegation 
occurring below and above the nation-state.  
 
The Dynamics of Dual Delegation 
  Elected officials and delegated agents increasingly find themselves in a world of 
what I term dual delegation.  Authority has been dispersed to sub-national and 
international organizations. As authority is divided and shared across the various levels of 
governance, questions of bureaucratic autonomy and control arise.  Using insights from   11 
existing literature to gain analytic purchase, the following section attempts an initial 
investigation of how dual delegation affects these relationships.  Specifically, I propose a 
set of distinct yet overlapping research areas that deserve closer scrutiny: the 
disaggregated state, administrative daisy-chains, horizontal network brokerage, and 
leapfrogged alliances.  In each, existing conceptions of control are strained as agent 
principal relations confront dual delegation.  
Disaggregating the State 
  Much International Relations literature, and that which has examined questions of 
international delegation, implicitly or explicitly assume that there is a unitary state 
(Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984; Pollack 2003).  National governments delegate authority 
to international agents, which then may shirk their commitments and promote their own 
agenda.  National governments therefore devise institutional constraints that shape agent 
behavior.  The tug of war for control occurs between states and international 
organizations as simply depicted in figure 1. 
Figure 1: International Delegation with Unitary States 
 
Literature on transgovernmental relations, however, has stressed the importance 
of disaggregating the state in international affairs.  States are comprised of many actors in   12 
addition to the elected executive and the legislature.  Regulators, judges, civil servant 
bureaucrats all may play critical roles in international affairs (Slaughter 2004).  And as 
the delegation literature focusing on the domestic level has recognized, these domestic 
agents will attempt to assert their preferences just as those at the international level do 
(Wood 1988; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991).   
This notion of the disaggregated state then complicates principal control in 
international affairs.  National elected officials rarely directly monitor international agent 
activity. Rather they rely on domestically delegated agents as depicted in Figure 2.   
Figure 2: The Disaggregated State in Dual Delegation 
 
This view of the dual delegation process may then shed light on the process of 
control in international relations.  Take for example the debate over the comitology 
process in Europe.  Comitology is an oversight mechanism integrated into the EU policy-
making process whereby member state representatives advise the Commission on 
implementation procedures.  These committees may be empowered with varying levels of 
influence form advisory to regulatory.  While the empirical research demonstrates that 
the Commission’s first preference would be to have advisory comitology committees 
with less oversight power (Dogan 1997; Pollack 2002), there is also considerable   13 
evidence that these committees do not simply oppose Commission activism.  In fact, 
comitology committees often act in a consensual manner (Wessels 1998) and in some 
issue areas work closely with the Commisson to construct politically viable policy 
proposals (Joerges and Neyer 1997).  Ballmann, Epstein, and O’Halloran employ a game 
theoretical model to demonstrate that such committees may in fact reduce member state 
control by adding a middle layer of oversight (Ballmann, Epstein et al. 2002).  In order to 
evaluate the actual effect of comitology committees, it is vital to know the character of 
their membership and the memberships’ respective preferences.  In cases where 
comitology committees are composed of relatively autonomous domestic agents facing 
fewer formal institutional constraints their control function is likely to be more tenuous.  
Committees, by contrast, including directly elected national officials should more clearly 
reflect the preferences of member state principals.  In dissecting the state, a theoretical 
explanation for variation in comitology committee action emerges which also conforms 
to the expectations of the bureaucratic control literature.   
More generally, domestic agents, involved in their own control relationship with 
domestic principals, develop their own preferences vis-à-vis international agents.  
National agents may selectively ignore (or even support) IO activity that conflicts with 
national principal preferences.  Far from a simple story about state/international 
organization control, dual delegation increases the parties participating in the process.  
And as a result, control mechanisms may weaken and new ties may emerge that alter the 
power of players active in setting international political bargains.  The issue of weakening 
controls will be explored further in the next section while the importance of network ties 
will be developed in the sections that follow.   14 
Administrative Daisy-Chains  
  While national governments have delegated increasingly levels of responsibility 
to international organizations, these international organizations rarely have been provided 
with the resources to autonomously manage the tasks they face.  The Commission of the 
European Union employs 24,000 staff compared to the 200,000 that run the Swedish 
central government.  The World Trade Organization staff of 450 is equivalent to the 
personnel of one municipal hospital.  Not only do staff constraints confront IO 
operations, but those employed in Brussels or Geneva often lack the direct links to 
national interest groups and governments officials.  If this policy disconnect is left 
unaddressed, IO initiatives risk rejection by domestic actors.  Furthermore, IOs lack the 
financial resources to independently monitor implementation and compliance.  The 
budgets of the WTO, for example, is roughly $83 million.  These organizations, then, are 
fiscally constrained from seeking out regulatory infractions.  And even when they do 
uncover moments of non-compliance, they often lack the policy instruments necessary to 
devise a politically palatable corrective.  In short, international organizations face a 
capacity gap, lacking the in-house resources necessary to identify problem areas, define 
response strategies, and coordinate enforcement.
1   
  Luckily for many IO managers, a host of specialists exist at the national level who 
have been trained in regulatory affairs.  The staff of national agencies has a wealth of 
knowledge and this domestic regulatory expertise can supplement information gathering 
at the international level.  Local regulators have extensive contacts with public officials 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the resource constraints put on international organization such as the EU and the role 
of national experts see Demmke, C., E. Eberharter, et al. (1996). The History of Comitology. Shaping 
European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process. R. Pedler and 
G. Schaefer. Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration: 61-82.   15 
and industry interests groups, providing needed access to social partner input.  National 
agencies, then, serve as a conduit for third-party information concerning international 
initiatives.  Often these national regulators, in turn, act as the agents of harmonization and 
enforcement, implementing agreements reached at the international level (Raustiala 
2002).   
  As a result of the capacity gap, an administrative daisy-chain may emerge 
whereby national governments delegate a task to international organizations that then 
turn around and de facto delegate responsibility to sub-national actors as depicted in 
figure 3. 
Figure 3: Daisy-chains in Dual Delegation 
 
Following the original work on transgovernmental actors (Keohane and Nye 1974), 
informal ties are created among sub-national and supranational agents as the two work 
together to resolve regulatory dilemmas.  In some cases, informal international 
commissions and advisory agencies have been established to assist IO activity.  The 
World Bank or the IMF may contract out work to a set of domestic agents.  In other 
cases, enforcement is carried out by a network of national regulators with direct links to 
international agencies.  In either case, national regulators act simultaneously as arbiters of 
national and international law.    16 
  This pattern of daisy-chain delegation is most familiar to students of the European 
Union (Dehousse 1997).  Member states have resisted the creation of super-regulators at 
the supranational level and so national agents are left to monitor and enforce EU 
initiatives. In most policy fields such as food safety where a EU agency has been created, 
the agency has little direct regulatory power.  Rather, the agency serves as a coordination 
mechanisms for national regulators working on the issue (Majone 1997).  Even in policy 
areas, such as competition policy, were regulatory power has been delegated to a EU 
agent – the competition directorate – EU authorities have come to rely on national 
administrators.  In a 2003 regulation, the Commission decided to devolve increasing 
levels of authority to national competition agencies, who in concert with the EU 
Competition Directorate, monitor and enforce competition policy.  As of May 2004, 
National Competition Agencies are primarily responsible for monitoring and enforcing 
EU competition law.  A network of regulators has been constructed which is supervised 
and advised by the EU Competition Directorate, which in turn is responsible for 
monitoring National Competition Agency enforcement across the member states.
2  Even 
more extreme, is the creation in a range of sectors of transgovernmental networks that 
actively monitor and oversee EU wide policy.  The Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), for example, which is comprised of national securities agencies with 
an independent international secretariat, has the authority to monitor the implementation 
of EU regulation and advise new EU regulation.  In sectors from utilities to 
                                                 
2 See Cellere, S. and G. Mezzapesa (2004). "From Burdensome Regulation to Self-Assessment." Jones 
Day.   17 
telecommunications, such networks of national regulators have been constructed that 
oversee European legislative implementation.
3 
While the EU provides the most mature and researched instance of daisy-chained 
delegation, it is far from an isolated instance.  Regional environment cooperative, for 
instance, has come to rely on national regulatory authorities.  In North America, the 
signatures of the North American Free Trade Agreement created the Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to oversee pollution problems in the free trade area.  
As part of this process a standing North American Working Group on Environmental 
Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation was created.  This working group comprises 
the national regulators of the three countries which meet regulatory to exchange 
information on environmental concerns that affect the three nations.  National expertise is 
shared across agencies as well as with the CEC which relies on national agencies for 
needed technical knowledge (Fulton and Sperling 1996; Raustiala 2002).  
  This pattern of international decentralized administration has important 
implications for issues of control and autonomy.  As enforcement responsibility is re-
delegated from an international agency to a national agent, in practice multiple principals 
emerge.
4 International agents become pseudo-principals as they further delegate authority 
and both domestic and international principals may find their monitoring and sanctioning 
abilities compromised.  Monitoring systems developed by national principals to stay 
abreast of IO activity fail to oversee re-delegation activity. Member states have, for 
                                                 
3 In telecommunications the European Commission formalized the European Regulatory Group, in energy 
the Council for European Energy Regulators,  in financial security the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators.  See Geveke, A. (2003). "Improving Implementation by National Regulatory Authorities." 
Eipascope(3): 26-30. 
4 For a discussion of the effect of multiple principals on control see McCubbins, M., R. Noll, et al. (1987). 
"A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion." American Journal of Political Science 33(3): 588-
611.   18 
example, very few mechanisms to deal with institutions such as CESR or the 
transgovernmental network of competition agencies that advise and enforce EU policy.  
Because of the costs associated with direct monitoring, national principals often 
outsource surveillance to domestic interest groups (McCubbins and Schwartz 1987).  
These groups, however, are not equally organized at the international level.  The failure 
of European business to organize itself at the European level is a glaring example of the 
variance in interest representation between the national and international levels (Wallace 
and Young 2001).  Additionally, horizontal networks of national regulators do not face 
the same accountability and transparency requirements as individual national members 
(Slaughter 2000).  So not only are interest groups potentially less well organized to 
monitor horizontal networks but they also lack the needed access to uncover divergent 
behavior.
5 Domestic agents, then, may face fewer formal institutional constraints when 
they are active in the international domain than in their home jurisdiction.    
Horizontal Network Brokerage 
  Not only are formal institutional constraints affected, but new transgovernmental 
networks emerge.  As authority for a particular issue area is delegated within countries, 
the respective national agents created in the delegation process form relationships with 
one another.  While the Basel Committee of independent central bankers is probably the 
most well known, horizontal transgovernmental networks have been active in a wide 
range of sectors including telecommunications, aviation, and the environment (Bermann 
1993; Fulton and Sperling 1996).  Unanticipated by the original transgovernmental 
                                                 
5 The chorus of business firms decrying the comitology process in Europe whereby national experts 
monitor EU implementation issues offers a glaring example of the limits of fire alarms as a mechanisms of 
control over horizontal networks.  See Wessels, W. (1998). "Comitology: fusion in action." Journal of 
European Public Policy 5(2): 209-34.    19 
literature, these associations of national agents often set up and maintain their networks 
without direct help from either IOs or national governments.  Research has established 
that such agglomerations of sub-national authorities may provide an important 
international governance alternative to traditional intergovernmental treaties or formal 
international organizations.  Portrayed as faster, more efficient, and flexible, horizontal 
transgovernmental networks as depicted in figure 4 share information, establish best 
practices, harmonize standards, and enforce agreements (Slaughter 2000; Slaughter 
2004).   
Figure 4: Horizontal Brokers in Dual Delegation 
 
  In light of the bureaucratic autonomy literature, it is important to not only focus 
on the governance role that such networks provide but also examine how they may 
leverage their resources to affect the political process.  Such horizontal networks may 
build coalitions that influence the behavior of international organizations and 
international outcomes (Newman 2005).  Relying on their technical and moral expertise, 
national regulators, working together, have the ability to build an agenda for international 
action.  Once the agenda is established, they have links to both national and international 
actors enhancing their ability to persuade those in decision-making posts and broker 
policy action.     20 
  The network augments the ability of national agents to assert their preferences at 
the international level.  The group has the ability to mobilize the stature of its collective 
expertise.  A statement by the world’s securities and exchange commissioners has unique 
authority distinct from that of its individual members.  The collective enjoys a degree of 
fairness and equity above that of single great power agents at the same time that it draws 
on the individual reputations of its members.  Additionally, the complementary resources 
of the members enhances the networks ability to shape outcomes.  Some network 
participants may have limited budgets or few rule-making authority in their domestic 
environment but find their political resources enhanced by the statutory prowess of others 
within the network.  Finally, each member of the network has its own distinct national 
allies that it can bring to bear on elected decision-makers and international organizations.  
At the hub of an international wheel with spokes extending out into domestic 
constituencies, horizontal transgovernmental networks potentially have a wide range of 
resources at their disposal (Padgett and Ansell 1993). 
  Transgovernmental brokership, then, not only posses a challenge to national 
principals but international organizations as well.  While the original transgovernmental 
literature anticipated that these networks would be directly linked to international 
organizations, they are in fact often housed in independent private secretariats and far 
more independent from IO subordination.  As a result, they may not only supplement IO 
authority with information and expertise as they do in the daisy-chain but may offer an 
alternative both in terms of governance and political voice.        21 
Leapfrogged Alliances 
  The dual delegation process has an additional implication for network 
relationships in international affairs.  As sub-national and international agents set out 
simultaneously to shape a policy domain, they often confront resistance or inertia at the 
national level.  National governments naturally attempt to control agent behavior, 
limiting activities that expand agent competencies or diverge from principal preferences.  
Agents, by contrast, seek to expand their competency and forward their policy initiatives 
(Pollack 2003).  Owing to their minimal formal legislative power, agents must rely on 
their reputation and network of alliances to achieve their preferences.  A second form of 
transgovernmental coalition, leapfrogged alliances, occurs when sub-national and 
international actors form relationships with one another that they then leverage vis-à-vis 
national principals as depicted in figure 5.   
Figure 5: Leapfrog Alliances in Dual Delegation 
 
Agents then from multiple jurisdictional levels may conspire against their shared national 
principal to create the space for entrepreneurial policy-making.
6  Similar to firms engaged 
in market making, in which future competitors cooperate to construct a marketplace in 
which they will at some later date compete, agents may cooperate to shape their political 
environment. 
                                                 
6 I thank David Bach for clarifying my thoughts on this.   22 
  The development of judicial authority at the regional level offers the most well 
documented example of such leapfrogged alliances at work.  While many scholars of 
European integration bemoaned the sclerotic nature of European integration in the 1970s, 
a political transformation was already in progress (Weiler 1991).  This transformation 
relied on a set of vertical alliances between the European Court of Justice and lower 
courts in member states of the European Community that radically expanded the 
authority of Community law.  Through a series of decisions handed down over a thirty-
year period, the European Court of Justice asserted that Community law superceded 
national law when the two conflicted.  Establishing both direct effect and supremacy, the 
ECJ altered the balance of power between the European and member state levels.  The 
ability of the ECJ to accomplish this feat rested in large part on the support of lower 
courts in the member states that saw an opportunity to expand their competence at the 
same time that European authority was augmented (Burley and Mattli 1993; Alter 1998).  
It was then the national governments and high courts of the member states which were 
sidestepped as this leapfrogged alliance recreated political authority within the 
Community. 
  Similar linkages have formed in a series of sectors between member state 
regulators and the Commission of the European Union.  In fields as diverse as financial 
securities, telecommunications, and data privacy, EU directives have formalized these 
relationships between sub-national actors and EU agents.  Agents from the two levels are 
then in constant contact with one another, well positioned to develop common policy 
initiatives and regulatory agendas.  The Lamfalussy process, one of the most well 
documented of these vertical networks, has been active in the financial securities sector   23 
since 2001.  Realizing the complexity of the integration process in the sector, both 
national regulators and EU officials looked for means to coordinate activity.  Sub-
national regulators began meetings in 1997 as part of the Forum of European Securities 
Commission (FESCO).  This horizontal network of national securities regulators 
attempted to smooth regulator frictions among member states.  But as the integration of 
the financial services sector progressed, EU officials sought to bind sub-national activity 
directly into EU activities.  As a result of a review chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, an 
agreement was reached to formalize sub-national coordination in CESR and link this 
process with EU initiatives.  In 2003, the Lamfalussy process was extended and similar 
vertical networks were established in the banking and insurance sectors (Lotte 2005).  
Policy formulation and discussions then may proceed between national regulators and EU 
officials sidestepping national governments.  This is not to say that these vertical 
networks can impose their agenda on national parliaments.  But they are well positioned 
first to develop a detailed policy platform and second to build support for their position 
among their various constituencies.  In short, leapfrogged alliances raise the costs to 
national governments of inaction.  
 
Conclusion 
  This paper has attempted to offer a first cut at a phenomenon that has received 
little attention in the literature: Dual Delegation.  That is the delegation of authority to 
agents above and below the level of the nation state.  Applying research on delegation 
both national and international to this question, an initial effort has been made to 
construct analytic tools with which to understand the effect of dual delegation on   24 
bureaucratic control and autonomy.  I argue that dual delegation has important 
implications for the ability of principals to monitor and sanction agent behavior as well as 
the reputational and network resources available to agents.  In an attempt to focus the 
discussion, I highlight four features of dual delegation: disaggregated state, daisy-chains, 
brokers, and leapfrogged alliances.   This preliminary discussion suggests that dual 
delegation weakens the traditional formal mechanisms used by national elected officials 
to constrain domestic and international agents in global politics.  At the same time, it has 
expanded the resources via policy networks available to national agents to forge 
coalitions of support behind their agenda.  Interestingly, this initial investigation suggests 
that national agents may be the unexpected winners of the dual delegation process. While 
this paper in no way offers an exhaustive discussion of the effect of dual delegation on 
bureaucratic control, it underscores the need to take seriously its role in the changing 
landscape of international affairs.  
  Additional work is needed to test these relationships as well as tease out 
additional theoretical implications.  Under what background conditions, for example, are 
horizontal or vertical networks more or less likely to change the policy debate?  
Uncertainty has often been identified as a critical prerequisite of political 
entrepreneurship.  Does this hold in the case of dual delegation?  How may uncertainty be 
specifically specified so as to offer more generalizable conditions of influence?  
Frequently, principals use formal institutional controls to limit agent behavior.  Are there 
new control mechanisms available in a multilevel space? 
  An additional implicit area of concern is the role of timing in policy-making.  
How does the sequencing of delegation in the national and international spheres affect   25 
control relationships?  In the US, for example, the majority of independent regulatory 
agencies were established before the rapid globalization of the past twenty-five years.  In 
Europe, by contrast, supranational delegation preceded rapid national delegation.  As a 
result different legacy institutions exist in the two regions.   
  A primary goal of this essay is to expand the notion that transgovernmental actors 
may shape politics as well as provide governance solutions.  While this is a clear theme 
running through the transgovernmental literature since its inception, the primary focus 
has been on the functional capacity of such networks to resolve governance dilemmas.  
Whether through information, harmonization, or enforcement, transgovernmental 
networks offer flexible and specialized instruments capable of managing a host of 
pressing international policy problems.  The issues raised by dual delegation, however, 
underscore the role that transgovernmental networks can play as important political 
actors capable of shaping policy outcomes.    
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